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Abstract 
We have an unwavering faith in research substantiated by numbers. In the popular imagination, 
quantitative methods are still seen as the most robust and reliable means to inform decision 
making. The hegemony exercised by mathematical reasoning is succinctly captured in the 
VWDWHPHQW³,ILWFDQ¶WEHFRXQWHGWKHQLWGRHVQ¶WFRXQW´ In this paper,¶GOLNHWRH[SORUHWKH
DVVXPSWLRQV XQGHUSLQQLQJ WKH µNQRZOHGJH FODLPV¶ PDGH E\ mathematically informed 
reasoning. By teasing out the reasoning processes through which quantitative analysis 
proceeds, I shall circumscribe the explanatory boundaries of the knowledge claims it can make. 
I then reflect on the knowledge contributions of techniques reliant on mathematical reasoning 
towards management and speculate on how the loose ends within such research programs can 
be strengthened. 
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1.0 Introduction 
It is an open secret that management research and scholarship, nurses a µSK\VLFV HQY\¶ 
(Ghoshal, 2005). By this, I refer to a disposition among a large swathe of management 
academics to value the pursuit of general, context-independent theoretical knowledge over the 
concrete, practical, context-dependent knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 66). Since Frederick 
7D\ORU¶VSHUVXDVLYHFDOOIRUDµVFLHQWLILFDSSURDFK¶WRPanagement, the field has witnessed a 
proliferation in the use of mathematical modelling; and more recently computer simulations as 
tools to strengthen our knowledge on management. In their quest for predictable theories within 
management, modern descendants of Archimedes are still looking for that fulcrum on which 
they can rest the lever that is to move the whole world. Much like physicists, who armed with 
WKHFHUWLWXGHVRIµODZV¶, undertake predictions of a natural phenomenon, social scientists crave 
for exactitude within their craft which would then allow them to predict and control a social 
phenomenon. The trouble within the social sciences, however, as Herbert Simon (1983) 
reminded us in a lucid commentary encapsulating the challengesLVWKHWUXLVP³no conclusions 
without premises´ (p. 5). 3XWGLIIHUHQWO\ZLWKLQWKHµSROLWLFVRIPHDQLQJ¶:  one of the objectives 
of social sciences after all is to explain, the meaning is context bound while the context itself 
is boundless.  
The above truism requires a little more unpacking. For this I turn to a wonderfully illuminating 
µ0HWDORJXH¶ DXWKRUHG E\ WKH LQWHOOHFWXDO PDYHULFN *UHJRU\ %DWHVRQ (1972, pp. 48-49). A 
metalogue is usually an imaginary dialogue between father and daughter where innocuous 
questions are used as vehicles to achieve transportation in thinking about seemingly simple 
µFRQFHSWV¶ 
Metaloque: What Is an Instinct? 
Daughter: Daddy, what is an instinct? 
Father: An instinct, my dear, is an explanatory principle.  
D: But what does it explain? 
F: Anything²almost anything at all. Anything you want it to explain. 
D: Don't be silly. It doesn't explain gravity. 
F: No. But that is because nobody wants "instinct" to explain gravity. If they did, it would 
explain it. We could simply say that the moon has an instinct whose strength varies inversely 
as the square of the distance. . 
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D: But that's nonsense, Daddy. 
F: Yes, surely. But it was you who mentioned "instinct," not I. 
D: All right²but then what does explain gravity? 
F: Nothing, my dear, because gravity is an explanatory principle. 
D: Oh. 
D: Do you mean that you cannot use one explanatory principle to explain another? Never? 
F: Hmm . . . hardly ever. That is what Newton meant when he said, "hypotheses non fingo." 
D: And what does that mean? Please. 
F: Well, you know what "hypotheses" are. Any statement linking together two descriptive 
statements is an hypothesis. If you say that there was a full moon on February 1st and another 
on March 1st; and then you link these two observations together in any way, the statement 
which links them is an hypothesis. 
D: Yes²and I know what non means. But what's fingo? 
F: Well²fingo is a late Latin word for "make." It forms a verbal noun fictio from which we 
get the word "fiction." 
D: Daddy, do you mean that Sir Isaac Newton thought that all hypotheses were just made up 
like stories? 
F: Yes²precisely that. 
7KHFUX[RI%DWHVRQ¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKDWDOONQRZLQJLVSUHGLFDWHGRQDVSHFXODWLRQRIWKHZRUOG
A speculation based on our personal assumptions of how we imagine our world. It is these 
imaginations which underpin the social science we build. As March (1999) writes, ³7he major 
claim to legitimacy by a social scientist is the claim that his procedures systematically evaluate 
WKHTXDOLW\RIKLVPRGHOVDQGWKXVWKDWKLVVSHFXODWLRQVDUHJRRGRQHV´(p. 307). For the most 
part, I think the claim is reasonable; but we need occasionally to examine the problems of 
evaluating our imaginations and the biases that confound our efforts to produce good 
speculations Put differently, we need to constantly re-PLQGRXUVHOYHVRI WKH µRZLQJ¶ LQRXU
µNQRZLQJ¶ 
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Someone who understood the profound role played by imagination within theoretical 
speculation was the poet William Blake. Caught between theological dogma dispensed by the 
church and rational dogma which emerging science espoused, Blake was resigned to the 
necessity of 1HZWRQ¶V DUWLILFLDOO\ VLPSOLILHG FRQFHSW JUDYLW\ D VHPLQDO LGHD DURXQGZKLFK
physical theory could take shape. But equally, he also understood its deceptiveness. In a letter 
to his patron and friend Thomas Butts, Blake wrote:  
Now I, a fourfold vision see 
And a fourfold vision is given to me 
µTis fourfold in my supreme delight 
$QGWKUHHIROGLQVRIW%HXODK¶VQLJKW 
And twofold Always. May God us keep 
)URP6LQJOHYLVLRQ	1HZWRQ¶VVOHHS 
²William Blake (1802) 
                  
Imagination therefore has a key role to play in revitalising the sciences by challenging the 
assumed ideas of an age. Whitehead describes such assumptions DVWKH³DVVXPSWLRQVZKLFK
appear so obvious that people do not know that they are assuming them because no other way 
RISXWWLQJWKLQJVKDVHYHURFFXUUHGWRWKHP´(quoted in Trilling, 1976, p. 190). To scholars, 
then fall the responsibility of helping good ideas forged by their predecessors, find a new life 
in the imaginations of their successors (Cohen, 2012, p. 19). This paper is written, precisely in 
such a spirit. The remainder of this paper is organised into four sections. In section two, I 
venture into the meta-theory which underpins the µtechnology of mathematics¶. The goal here, 
is to examine some of the core assumptions underpin mathematical reasoning and in so doing, 
to circumscribe the knowledge claims it can make. Section three explores how mathematical 
thought has been translated and applied within management research. Here, the goal is to 
contextualise the impact of mathematical thought on management research and scholarship and 
to better illustrate the contributions as well as limitations of this analytical technique. In section 
four, I consolidate the insights which emerge from the analysis to argue for a switch in our 
understanding of rigour in research. Traditionally, rigour in research has been understood as 
precision in measurement and accuracy in data gathering. Here, my core argument is that whilst 
these are important, it is even more important to have µprecision¶ in thought. It is this 
reflexivity, I argue, that is key to more insightful research. I finally conclude by summarising 
the core arguments articulated along with its implications for the practice of research.  
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2.0 Speculation in Mathematical Thought 
The management scientists, who are enthusiastically committed to their quantitative methods 
and to their principles, make the mistake of believing that, being scientists, they do not deal in 
assumptions, preferences and conclusions. There is a prevailing thought within this school that 
the lack of precise laws which are universal and timeless is because of the inadequate 
sophistication is quantifying data. Therefore, the prescription has been more mathematical 
models and more computer simulations to analyse systematic experimenting. What is not 
prescribed is to be out there within the thick of the action and to experience the unfolding of 
the social phenomenon under investigation. Those of us like me, (in the interest of full 
GLVFORVXUH,¶PDWUDLQHGHQJLQHHUZLWKDEDFKHORU¶VGHJUHHLQ(OHFWULFDO(QJLQHHULQJ) emphasis 
was always placed on the reliability of mathematical formulations and systematic 
experimentation.  
Social science in this sense, was perceived as a particular laggard. This was primarily attributed 
to the lack of computing capacity available to analyse the overwhelming complexity of data 
produced within the social phenomena. Now clearly, the argument goes, with rapid strides 
made within computing, it should be easier for us to crunch numbers and develop extremely 
dependable models of the social phenomena we are investigating. Such an approach would 
FRQIHU WKHOHJLWLPDF\RI WKHµVFLHQWLILFbases¶ to our knowledge claims which we so deeply 
crave. This, as I shall argue in the sections which follow, is based upon a naïve understanding 
RIZKDW,¶GOLNHWRFDOOWhe µtechnology of mathematics¶. 
The technology of mathematics is a beautiful and dignified abstraction. Its originality consists 
in the fact that within the mathematical sciences, connections between things are exposed, 
which besides agency in human reason, are extremely unobvious (Whitehead, 1925, p. 19). But 
it is a mistake to treat the technology of mathematics as inviolable to that ineradicable element 
of arbitrariness prevalent in human reasoning. Wiser people have said wiser things on this 
subject already and so my limited purpose here is to remind you of the significance of their 
ideas and to then identify some possible domains in which our current instincts might be 
prejudiced in significant ways. Here, I borrow from the writings of the mathematician turned 
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1925, pp. 19-37). 
The technology of mathematics evokes in our minds, a science devoted to the exploration of 
numbers, quantity, geometry and in contemporary times, investigation into yet more abstract 
concepts of order, causality and into analogous types of purely logical relations. Consider for 
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example the numbers seven and five. We could have seven cows, seven sandwiches, seven 
mangoes, seven colours and so on. Similarly for the number five, we have five fingers, five 
toes, five senses and so on. While the mere thought of a number, here the number seven or the 
number five does not evoke anything, paring it with an entity, cows, sandwiches, colours or 
senses, makes thinking about things possible. So while applying the technology of 
mathematics, we always get rid of particular instances and particular sorts of entities. So even 
though cows are very different from say, our senses, in the realm of mathematics, and here I 
mean pure mathematics, five in cows is the same as five in senses with the number five referring 
impartially to any group of five entities. In other words, no mathematical truths apply merely 
to cows, or colours or sandwiches or senses. Mathematical operations applicable to cows are 
WKHVDPHDVWKDWFDQEHDGPLQLVWHUHGRQWKHVHQVHVVDQGZLFKHVRUPDQJRHV,Q:KLWHKHDG¶V 
(1925) words,  
³6RORQJDV\ou are dealing with pure mathematics, you are in the realm of complete and absolute 
abstraction. All you assert is, that reason insists on the administration that, if any entities whatever 
have any relations which satisfy such and such purely abstract conditions, then they must have other 
UHODWLRQVZKLFKVDWLVI\RWKHUSXUHO\DEVWUDFWFRQGLWLRQV´(p. 21). 
7KH FHUWDLQW\ RI PDWKHPDWLFV WKHUHIRUH GHSHQGV RQ LWV µFRPSOHWH DEVWUDFW JHQHUDOLW\¶
(Whitehead, 1925, p. 22). But we can have no a priori certainty that we are right in believing 
that the observed entities form a particular instance of what falls under our general reasoning. 
Therefore, in order to make an intelligible use of the technology of mathematics, three 
processes must be kept in mind. 
First, the purely mathematical reasoning must be thoroughly scanned to make sure that there 
are no causal slips in it, no causal illogicalities due to failure in reasoning. This particular 
criterion is a vital premise underpinning mathematical reasoning but is particularly difficult to 
adhere to within the social sciences where causal relations are at best ambiguous. This point is 
succinctly illustrated in this conversation between a doctor and a management scientist which 
,¶YHUHSURGXFHGIURPDQHVVD\E\:LOOLDP6WDUEXFN(2004).  
 ³I told this doctor that I had been trying to create a computer program to make medical diagnoses 
because I wanted to improve medical care.  
+HUHVSRQGHGµ%XWGLDJQRVLVLVQRWLPSRUWDQWWRJRRGPHGLFDOFDUH*RRGGRFWRUVGRQRWUHO\RQ
GLDJQRVHV¶ 
µ%XW PHGLFDO VFKRROV WHDFK GRFWRUV WR WUDQVODWH V\PSWRPV LQWR GLDJQRVHV DQG WKHQ WR EDVH
WUHDWPHQWVRQGLDJQRVHV¶,SURWHVWHG 
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µ7KDW¶VULJKW0HGLFDOVFKRROVGRWHDFKWKDW¶KHFRQFHGHGµEXWWKHGRFWRUVZKRGRZKDWWKH\ZHUH
taught never become good doctors. There are many more combinations of symptoms than there are 
diagnoses, so translating symptoms into diagnoses discards information. And there are many more 
treatments than diagnoses, so basing treatments on diagnoses adds random errors. Doctors can make 
more dependable links between symptoms and treatments if they leave diagnoses out of the chain. 
µ+RZHYHUWKHOLQNVEHWZHHQsymptoms and treatments are not the most important keys to finding 
effective treatments. Good doctors pay careful attention to how patients respond to treatments. If a 
patient gets better, current treatments are heading in the right direction. But, current treatments often 
do not work, or they produce side-effects that require correction. The model of symptoms±
diagnoses±treatments ignores the feedback loop from treatments to symptoms, whereas this 
feedback loop is the most important factor. 
µ'RFWRUV VKRXOG not take diagnoses seriously because strong expectations can keep them from 
noticing important reactions. Of course, over time, sequences of treatments and their effects produce 
evidence that may lead to valid diagnoses¶´(pp. 1249-1250). 
 
Such causal ambiguities therefore need to be kept in mind before mathematical reasoning can 
proceed. This brings us to the second SURFHVVZLWKLQPDWKHPDWLFDOUHDVRQLQJ7KLVLVWR³PDNH
quite certain of all the abstraFWFRQGLWLRQVZKLFKKDYHEHHQSUHVXSSRVHGWRKROG´(Whitehead, 
1925, p. 22). In other words, the abstract premises from which the mathematical reasoning 
proceeds must be determined. This means that inferring through the principle of induction from 
mathematical reasoning cannot guarantee infallible general laws, without risk of error, from 
VSHFLILFIDFWVHYHQP\ULDGVRIWKHP³1RQXPEHURIYLHZLQJVRIZKLWHVZDQVFDQJXDUDQWHH
that a black swan will not be spotted next. Whether even a definite probability statement can 
be made about the colour of the next swan is a matter of debate, with the negatives, 
RXWQXPEHULQJWKHDIILUPDWLYHV´(Simon, 1983, p. 6). 
The third process LVWKDWRI³YHULI\LQJ that our abstract postulates hold for the particular case 
LQTXHVWLRQ´(Whitehead, 1925, p. 23)7KLVLVSUREOHPDWLFHYHQZLWKLQVFLHQFHZKHUHµIDFWV¶
are gathered using instruments that are themselves permeated with theoretical assumptions. 
Take for example a microscope which is used to make observations. Is it possible to construct 
one without at least a primitive theory of light and optics?  
0DWKHPDWLFDO UHDVRQLQJ WKHUHIRUH JDLQV LWV JHQHUDOL]DELOLW\ IURP WKH ³IDFW WKDW WKH\ DUH
expressible without reference to those particular relations or to those particular relata which 
occur in that particulaURFFDVLRQRIH[SHULHQFH´(Whitehead, 1925, p. 24). But it is this very 
generalizability facilitated by the technology of mathematics which robs it of its relevance on 
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that particular occasion of experience, a point of grave sensitivity to any social science. Let me 
illustrate this point using an example, I borrow from the writings of William James 
(1909/2011).  
³Consider a chemist who exercising his/her knowledge in mathematics tells us that two atoms of 
hydrogen and one of oxygen combine themselves of their own accord into the new compound 
VXEVWDQFHµZDWHU¶7KLVLVEXWDQelliptical statement for a more complex fact. That fact is that when 
hydrogen and oxygen, instead of keeping far apart, get into closer quarters, say into the position H-
O-H, they affect surrounding bodies differently, they now, wet our skin, dissolve sugar, put out fire, 
HWFZKLFKWKH\GLGQ¶WLQWKHLUIRUPHUSRVLWLRQVµ:DWHU¶LVEXWRXUQDPHIRUZKDWDFWVSHFXOLDUO\
But if the skin, sugar and fire were absent, no witness would speak of water at all. He would still 
talk of the hydrogen and oxygen distributively, merely noting that they acted now in the new 
position H-O-H´ (p. 63).  
Quality has thus been expressed in terms of a numerically determined quantity, two hydrogen 
atoms and one oxygen atom. This simultaneous generalization and abstraction of a particular 
property within an experience always more or less deforms the property by the extension it 
gives to it (Bergson, 1912/1999, p. 29). Such is the operation of mathematical reasoning. In 
sum, ensuring the elimination of causal slips and causal illogicalities due to failure in reasoning, 
belief in the prior supposition of the logic which drives inductive reasoning and ensuring that 
the quality of this reasoning process remains more or less stable within the particular case being 
investigated are all preconditions necessary for the triumph of abstract mathematical reasoning.  
 
3.0 Mathematical Thought and Management Research 
 
The assumption that the general conditions transcend any one set of particular entities is the 
JURXQG IRU WKH HQWU\ RI WKH QRWLRQ RI µYDULDEOH¶ Also, just as numbers are abstracted from 
reference to any one particular set of entities, algebra allows abstraction from the notion of any 
particular number. In other words, algebra serves as what the Californian painter Robert Irwin 
ZRXOGFDOOµDFRPSRXQGHGDEVWUDFWLRQ¶ZLWKLQWKHWHFKQRORJ\RIPDWKHPDWLFV,WVHVVHQFHLV
best captured in oQHRI,UZLQ¶VIDYRXULWHPD[LPVµVHHLQJLVIRUgetting the name of the thing 
VHHQ¶TXRWHGLQWeick, 2006, p. 1726). Put simply, a concept used to explain a phenomena 
within science is nothing but an analytical abstraction performed by the scientist. The purpose 
of such an H[HUFLVHLVWRµEODFN-ER[¶DVWUHDPRIH[SHULHQFHIRUFRQYHQLHQWODWHUXVH+RZHYHU
the indiscriminate use of one black box to explain another is a major intellectual vice within 
social science. Let me try and illustrate my point using an example narrative by Bateson (1972), 
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³In ancient Rome, a candidate was once asked during his oral doctoral examination by the learned 
GRFWRUVRQ WKH³FDXVHDQGUHDVRQ´ZK\RSLXPSXWVSHRSOH WRVOHHS7KHFDQGLGDWH WULXPSKDQWO\
DQVZHUV ³%HFDXVH WKHUH LV LQ LWDGRUPLWLYHSULQFLSOH´6XFKUHDVRQLQJ Ls not uncommon to the 
statistical disciplines within management studies where a systematic record of the interaction 
between man and opium is observed, recorded and then given a fictitious cause, namely the 
³GRUPLWLYHSULQFLSOH´The dormitive principle here, is now a compounded abstraction. Either the 
opium contains a reified dormative principle, or the man contains a reified need for sleep, which is 
³H[SUHVVHG´LQKLVUHVSRQVHWRRSLXP$QGFKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\all such hypotheses, generated through 
a blunt use of mathematical reasoning DUH³GRUPDWLYH´; in the sense that they put our critical faculty 
to sleep´ (p. 17). 
In order to create a mathematical model, one states a set of assumptions and then uses algebra 
to extract some implications of these assumptions. One can experiment with different 
assumptions until the model exhibits the properties one desires. Likewise, when one creates a 
computer simulation, one states a set of assumptions and the computer generates some 
implications of these assumptions. Since computers do nothing on their own initiative, 
simulations can only reveal the logical implications of what researchers believed before they 
created the simulations or what they assumed during the process of creating their models 
(Starbuck, 2004). ³One does computer simulation because one does not know how to model 
RQH¶V WKHRU\ PDWKHPDWLFDOO\´ writes Startbuck (2004). He continues, ³This might occur 
because one has little knowledge of mathematics, but it can also occur because mathematics is 
not capable of providing answers.´(p. 1237). Because of this, problems must be quantified in 
a manner amenable to mathematical techniques and this poses a serious limitation on the 
applicability of operations research and management science techniques to social science 
problems (Simon, 1983, p. 91).  
A second feature of quantitative reasoning is that a multitude of nonlinear, discontinuous, 
interacting assumptions has the potential to generate outputs that appear mysterious, even 
magical. Because simulations are process oriented, researchers have to specify activity 
sequences apiori even when they lack information about them WKHUHE\ YLRODWLQJ WKH ³QR
FRQFOXVLRQVZLWKRXWSUHPLVHV´WHQHWLQJHQHUDOUHDVRQLQJ. Large, complex simulation models 
are virtually impossible to validate in detail. Even though such models are used within decision 
making for their predictive power, predictability is not the same as understanding and it is quite 
possible that it is possible without understanding (Boisot & Mckelvey, 2010). Boisot and 
McKelvey (2010) cite the Nobel laureate Richard Feynman who is said to have famously 
TXLSSHGµ'espite its remarkable predictive achievements, no one really understands quantum 
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PHFKDQLFV¶(cited in Boisot & Mckelvey, 2010, p. 419). Lansing (2003) further emphasises this 
point when he writes: 
µ%XWLIZHVKLIWRXUDWWHQWLRQIURPWKHFDXVDOIRUFHVDWZRUNRQLQGLYLGXDOHOHPHQWVWRWKHEHKDYLRXU
of the system as a whole, global patterns of behaviour may become apparent. However, the 
understanding of global patterns is purchased at a cost: The observer must usually give up the hope 
RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH ZRUNLQJV RI FDXVDWLRQ DW WKH OHYHO RI LQGLYLGXDO HOHPHQWV ³7KH VWDWLVWLFDO
PHWKRG´ ZURWH SK\VLFLVW -DPHV &OHUN 0D[ZHOO LQ  ³LQYROYHV DQ DEDQGRQPHQW RI VWULFW
G\QDPLFDOSULQFLSOHV´9ROS¶(p. 185). 
Anderson (1999) too has cautioned against this tendency within mathematical modelling where 
scholars abstract away nonlinear interactions for the sake of analytical tractability, even though 
the emergence of pattern depends on such interactions. 
Stated differently, computers generate outputs without explaining their reasoning. Researchers 
can add instructions to their programs that record calculation sequences but simulation 
programs typically incorporate so many microscopic steps that the explanations themselves 
pose serious data-analysis challenges. As a result, researchers are likely to end up with 
simulated behaviours that they cannot understand, a phenomenon termed the %RQLQL¶V3DUDGR[. 
Starbuck (2004) elaborates the %RQLQL¶V3DUDGR[as follows: 
 µ$VDPRGHOJURZVPRUHUHDOLVWLFLWDOVREHFRPHVMXVWDVGLIILFXOWWRXQGHUVWDQGDVWKHUHDO-world 
SURFHVVHVLWUHSUHVHQWV¶(p. 1238) 
Since a model is built to demonstrate a causal understanding of organising processes; 
complexification of a model undermines the interdependences between subroutines by making 
it more, thereby rendering the model no easier to understand than the original causal process. 
Named after CKDUOHV%RQLQL¶VPRGHOZKLFKUHSUHVHQWHGDK\SRWKHWLFDOILUP¶VGHWDLOHGGHFLVLRQ
making as it decided how much to produce, what prices to charge, and so forth; within a short 
time, the model could generate many years of decision making, and allowed the researcher to 
vary elements of both the decision processes and the environment of the firm.  
³But as &KDUOHV¶V (1963, p. 136) ZURWHµ:HFDQQRWH[SODLQFRPSOHWHO\WKHUHDVRQVZK\WKHILUP
behaves in a specific fashion. Our model of the firm is highly complex, and it is not possible to trace 
out the behaviour pattern throughout the firm ... Therefore, we cannot pinpoint the explicit causal 
mechanism in the model´ (quoted in Starbuck, 2004, p. 1238).  
In other words, compounding abstractions leads to a barrenness of understanding. In a tradeoff 
between understanding and prediction, good theories should always favour understanding. 
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A third often misguided critique offered by practitioners of quantitative techniques is their 
criticism of subjectivity in non-quantitative studies. This often takes the form of inadequate 
sample size, success bias in sampling, a µPHUH FDVH VWXG\¶ WR VWDWH D IHZ <et their own 
subjectivity is sometimes extreme. In the nature of our enterprise, a degree of subjectivity is 
inevitable. Intellectual safety would then seem to lie, not only in increasing the number of 
mechanical checks or in more rigorously examining those assumptions which had been brought 
to conscious formulation, but also in straight-forwardly admitting that subjectivity was bound 
to appear and inviting the reader to be on the watch for it (Trilling, 1976). This rarely happens. 
Take for example, reports by social scientists which routinely overstate the generality of their 
observations. In particular, researchers often conceal the ambiguity in their observations by 
focusing on averages and using hypothesis tests about averages to convert ambiguities into 
apparently clear conclusions.  
Thus, instead of characterizing statistical findings by stating percentages such as µSHUFHQW
of adult men have dark KDLU¶UHVHDUFKHU¶V state, test, and do not UHMHFWWKHK\SRWKHVLVµ0HQ
have dark hDLU¶7KHQWKH\GHVFULEHVXFKILQGLQJV, since the measure is statistically significant 
E\ VD\LQJ µ0HQ KDYH dark KDLU¶ DV LI WKH GHVFULSWLRQ GHVFULEHV HYHU\RQH RU every situation 
(Starbuck, 2004, p. 1245).Thus truly absorbing studies in data and quantities may have the 
unfortunate effect of strengthening the µYDOLGLW\FODLPV¶still more with people who are by no 
means trained to invert the process of abstraction and to put the fact back into the general life 
from which it has been taken. Mathematical systems have a greater sensitivity to initial 
conditions, which make their dependency and hence uniqueness, stronger making 
generalizations in social science extremely difficult. Furthermore, chaotic systems often exhibit 
recursive symmetries at different scale levels, which, as Tsoukas (2005) observes, 
mathematicians surprisingly approach with qualitative analysis methods (Voelpel & Meyer, 
2006, p. 1566). 
Finally I speculated that a similar phenomenon might occur with cross-sectional data for five 
broad reasons: 
¾ First, a few broad characteristics of people and social systems pervade psychological 
data sex, age, intelligence, social class, income, education, or organization size. Such 
variables correlate with many behaviour and with each other.  
¾ 6HFRQGUHVHDUFKHUV¶GHFLVLRQVDERXWKRZWRWUHDWGDWDFDQFUHDWHFRUUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ
variables.  
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¾ Third, so-FDOOHGµVDPSOHV¶DUHIUHTXHQWO\not random, and many of them are complete 
subpopulations even though study after study has turned up evidence that people who 
live close together, who work together, or who socialize together tend to have more 
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours in common than do people who are far apart 
physically and socially.  
¾ Fourth, some studies obtain data from respondents at one time and through one method. 
By including items in a single questionnaire or interview, researchers suggest to 
respondents that they ought to see relationships among these items (Starbuck, 2004, p. 
1244). 
¾ Fifth, and crucially, the role of time is underplayed in such models. While we all have 
to act in time, such models judge actions by timeless standards. The attitude is best 
summed by Bateson (1979, p. 63) ZKHQ KH TXLSSHG ³LI >W@KH LI«WKHQ of causality 
FRQWDLQVWLPH´WKHQKRZFDQWKH³LI«WKHQRIORJLF´EHWLPHOHVV"´ 
In sum, the technology of mathematics, as used within management, allows us to argue 
inductively from data to hypothesis but seldom do we treat the hypotheses against the 
knowledge derived by deduction from the fundamentals of science or philosophy (Bateson, 
1972, p. xxv). ³We seek scientific rationality because it pleases our minds´, writes Starbuck 
(2004), ³but what gives our minds pleasure may not give us insight or useful knowledge´ (p. 
1239). Such reasoning as described, usually consists in passing from concepts to things, and 
seldom from things to concepts. This I believe is the Achilles heel of developing theories with 
mathematical reasoning.  
 
4.0 From Precision of Measurement to Precision of Thought 
Any research exercise involves a trade-off between simplicity, accuracy and generalizability 
(Weick, 1979). Any theory can therefore simultaneously be simple and accurate, simple and 
general or general and accurate but not all three at once. Our fixation with the need to be general 
has had an adverse impact on the simplicity and accuracy of the phenomena we theorise about 
within organisations. The result of mindlessly sticking to these IRUPXODLFQRWLRQVRIµULJRXU¶LV
what Chia (2014), in a recent article calls µa resultant rigor mortis¶, by which he means, µan 
LQWHOOHFWXDO µVWLIIQHVV¶ RI WKH PLQG WKDW GLVFRXUDJHV DQ\ NLQG RI VSHFXODWLYH FRQMHFWXULQJ
including especially the initial capacity to gloss over long stretches of incomprehension and to 
focus on only those aspects that appear immediately appealing or promising¶ (p. 684). 
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In order to arrest this rigor mortis which is setting into management research, where theorists 
are more keen on tracking tractable rather than relevant problems (Weick, 1989), I suggest we 
move to a more simple and accurate mode of theorising.  
A misguided anxiety about the need to be geneUDOWDNHVWKHIRUPDVFRUQIXOTXLSDERXW³:KDW
LQVLJKWVPLJKWEHJDLQHGIURPDµPHUHFDVH´"´9DQ0DDQHQSXWVLWZHOOZKHQKHZULWHV"The 
smart-DVVEXWZLVHDQVZHUWRWKLVKDFNQH\HGEXWFRPPRQSODFHTXHVWLRQLVµDOOZHFDQ¶ (Van 
Maanen, 2011, p. 227). ³If we are concerned about the imprecision of single site studies as 
research data´, then as Simon (1991) remarked, ³we can console ourselves by noting that a 
man named Darwin was able to write a very persuasive and perhaps even correct book on the 
origin of species on the basis of precisely such a study of the Galapagos Islands and a few other 
FDVHV7RWKHEHVWRIP\UHFROOHFWLRQWKHUHDUHQRVWDWLVWLFVLQ'DUZLQ¶VERRN´ (p. 128). 
Cultivating empirical sensitivity through detailed, theoretically informed, philosophically 
grounded, reflexive research, in other words, is crucial. Specificity of findings in management 
research, therefore is as, if not more important than generalizability. Is there any point at all in 
pursuing mathematically generalizable findings on a phenomena which is statistically 
significant across several organisations but is not applicable (at least without severe 
modifications) within a single one of these organisations? Several years ago, when Erving 
Goffman, was criticised for being too specific and too ready to wrap a concept around every 
VLWXDWLRQKHDQDO\VHGKLVEOXQW\HWHORTXHQWUHVSRQVHZDVµLWLVEHWWHUSHUKDSVWRKDYHGLIIHUHQW
coats to clothe the children well than a single, splendid teQWLQZKLFKWKH\DOOVKLYHU¶ (Goffman, 
1961, p. xiv).  
The need of the hour is more coats and lesser tents. As regards validity, such immersed research 
is based on interpretation and is open for testing in relation to other interpretations and other 
research. However one interpretation is not just as good as another, which would be the case 
for relativism. Every interpretation must be built of claims of validity, and the procedures 
ensuring validity are as demanding for such detailed research as for any other activity in the 
social sciences (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 130).  
 
5.0 Conclusion 
In this essay, I have attempted to explore the meta-theory of mathematical reasoning. The main 
inference I draw is that the social sciences are being inundated with statistically significant, but 
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meaningless noise, VXSSRVHGµILQGLQJV¶WKDWVD\QRWKLQJRIODVWLQJYDOXHEXWHQDEOHUHVHDUFKHUV
to publish a multitude of articles (Starbuck, 2004, pp. 1245-1246). ,¶PVXUHWKDWWKLVFRQFOXVLRQ
³ZLOOGLVFRQFHUWERWKWKRVHZKRreflect on the social sciences without practicing them and those 
ZKR SUDFWLFH WKHP ZLWKRXW UHIOHFWLQJ WKHP´ (Bourdieu, 1977/2002, p. vii). Mathematical 
reasoning is both necessary and useful as a technique to speculate if a phenomenon is 
happening. It is a rather blunt tool to infer how and why a phenomenon unfolds. Consider a 
simple word "democracy," for example. It is an abstraction from the experience of what it 
means to lead a free life within a nation state. We could now attempt to explain democracy by 
operationalising a scale of freedom constituted by dependent and independent variables and 
their variant relationships. Or we could explain it by describing its elements such as a free 
press, independent judiciary, due process, elected representatives and so on. Which of these 
would be a more meaningful explanation? 
In pursuing our purpose, and making our abstractions, we must be aware of what we are doing; 
we ought to have it fully in mind that our abstraction is not perfectly equivalent to the infinite 
complication of events from which we have abstracted (Trilling, 1976, pp. 188-189). 
Mathematics is only the science of magnitudes, and mathematical processes are applicable only 
to quantities, but as Henri Bergson (1912/1999, p. 52) UHPLQGVXV³it must not be forgotten that 
quantity is always quality in a nascent state; it is, we might say, the limiting case of equality.´ 
,¶GOLNHWRFRQFOXGHZLWK\HWDQRWKHUDQHFGRWH, narrated by James March (1999),  
³Several years ago, there was a well-known Californian child psychologist who at the end of each 
of her talks would invariDEO\EHDVNHG³0UV*UXHQEHUJGR\RXUHDOO\PHDQWKDWZHVKRXOGQHYHU
VSDQNRXUFKLOGUHQ"´WRZKLFKVKHZRXOGUHSO\³:HOO,VXSSRVHLI\RXNHHSUHPLQGLQJ\RXUVHOI
every moment that you should never ever spank your children, you will end up spanking them just 
DERXWWKHULJKWDPRXQW´(p. 359).  
BHIRUH,¶PDFFXVHGRIHQGRUVLQJSK\VLFDOFKLOGDEXVHOHWPHGLVWDQFHP\VHOIIURPWKe notion 
of spanking children. But lLNH0UV*UXQEHUJ¶VSUHFHSWVLt is my hope that with this brief essay, 
,¶YHEHHQDEOHWRFRQYLQFH\RXDOOWRFRPPLWWRDPRUHsparing, yet rigorous and reflexive use 
RIWKHµPDWKHPDWLFDOWHFKQRORJ\¶ZLWKLQRUJDQLVDWLRQDOVWXGLHV Such a renewed focus, I believe 
would not just arrest but poWHQWLDOO\UHYHUVHWKHµSXEOLVKDVZHSHULVK¶(Alvesson & Gabriel, 
2013, p. 246) trend in management research, by making it relevant to practise. 
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